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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

23 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Charles E. Waterman
National Intelligence Officer for NESAs

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Meeting - March 1982

1. Western Sahara. Pertinent analysts are agreed that, despite Moroccan troop buildups in its protected area and increased small-scale Polisario activity, no near-term large scale attack by either side is likely. Moroccan troop buildups are probably in reaction to Polisario activity, and no evidence of large sweep activity has been noted. Recent Moroccan air strikes have not had a significant military effect, although some empty permanent structures were destroyed. [REDACTED]

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2. India-Pakistan - Nuclear Update. Intelligence community judgments of six months ago were that India would not initiate another Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) prior to a Pakistani test. Several new elements in the situation lead us now to judge that an Indian PNE is more likely without prior Pakistani action. Specifically: preparation of a test site in India is proceeding. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Pakistani-Indian political relations have deteriorated during the past months; Indian perceptions are now known to be that Pakistan has sufficient material to initiate a test. We cannot state with certainty that an Indian test will occur -- merely that a decision by the Indians to proceed is more likely now than six months ago. [REDACTED]

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3. Pakistan-Afghanistan. [REDACTED]

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[redacted] In the more general
[redacted] sense, analysts judge that a temporary Soviet incursion of significant
size remains possible, and that it could occur with little advance
notification, given Soviet force enhancements already in place. The
increased air activity is not necessarily related to this judgment. [redacted]

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4. Libya - Reaction to US Sanctions. Little change in Libyan activity has been noted since publicity about US sanctions occurred. Qadhafi's "reasonable" posture in Austria presumably was tactical, and Libyan destabilizing activities elsewhere in the third world continue. No new terrorist activity directed against US officials has been noted, although Libya still intends militarily to oppose a US exercise in the Gulf of Sidra. Libyan petroleum exports have been reported at the unusually low level of 350,000 barrels/day, and reserves drawn down from \$13 billion to 7 or 8 billion by end 1981. This economic situation is not the result of US sanctions, but general market conditions. [redacted]

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5. Iran - Threats to the Gulf/Saudi Arabia. Discussions between Libya and Iran concerning military activity against Saudi Arabian petroleum facilities continue, but no indication of actual intentions to act has been obtained. [redacted]

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[redacted] ATT
agencies agree that the most likely Iranian threat across the Gulf is one of subversion, followed in order of likelihood by commando raid, air strikes, and a major operation. In summary: Iranian concern and contingency planning regarding actions against the petroleum producing states has intensified; they have the capability for limited operations against various targets. [redacted]

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6. Iran-Iraq War: Mining. It appears that Iraqis have implanted sea mines against Iranian shipping. These are probably of a helicopter-delivered, acoustic variety. [redacted]

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7. Lebanon-Israel-Syria. Despite the temporary calming effect of the Habib mission, no long-term solutions to the underlying tensions in this region have been found. Israel was sharply critical of Habib's mission, and brands the ceasefire as an umbrella for PLO buildup in South Lebanon. Ominously there have been five terrorist attempts in Israel since mid-March, none of which resulted in loss of life. [redacted]

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[redacted] This force strength continues to permit a rapid invasion of south Lebanon with little further buildup. In summary, all agencies feel an attack remains likely, could be provoked by a terrorist attack resulting in loss of life, and would occur with little intelligence early warning. A consensus exists that the date of Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai is no longer a consideration in the timing of a south Lebanon operation. [redacted]

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